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THE UNMAKING OF AN AFRICAN PETITE BOURGEOISIE: 
LOUREN~O MARQUES, MOZAMBIQUE* 
by Jeanne Penvenne 
This paper is an abbreviated version of a study of changing opportunities 
for African participation in the economy of colonial Louren~o Marques, 
Mozambique. The development of the city's black labor force has to be placed 
in the perspective of opportunities in the capitalist sector as well as those 
in the peasant and houshold production sectors. Individual strategies based 
upon perceived promise and constraint in all sectors fashioned the ultimate 
character of the urban labor force. 
Given the limited Portuguese presence in nineteenth century Louren~o 
Marques, expansion of the port complex, implantation of the state bureaucracy, 
and development of international commerce required cultivation of local 
traders, artisans, commodity producers and potential bureaucrats. Despite 
some technical and material limitations, many local Africans and 
Afro-Europeans took advantage of their access to the city's markets, lands and 
most appropriate educational opportunities to participate capably and 
profitably in the growing capitalist sector. The state, however, soon found 
it necessary to foster a local white petite bourgeoisie in order to accomodate 
the incoming white Portuguese population. The quality of Portuguese 
immigrants encouraged the state to funnel even the smallest, simplest 
business and career opportunities to them, thus cutting into African jobs and 
businesses, Furthermore, as the capitalist sector developed, so did its 
demand for cheap manual labor. In a combined effort to direct African 
manpower into cheap labor to service the growing capitalist sector and to 
advance the interests of its client white petite bourgeoisie, the Portuguese 
began to redefine appropriate economic behavior for black persons to suit a 
colonial capitalist economy based on cheap black labor with white or perhaps 
brown management. In. so doing, state controls tended to suffocate most 
upwardly mobile Africans and undermine the black petite bourgeoisie, 
This paper discusses these inter-related processes and the added 
competition from skilled, . capitalized foreigners to demonstrate their impact 
on the nascent African petite bourgeoisie. The impact was uneven, and 
therefore the chronology of marginalization varied depending upon the specific 
case. By the mid-thirties, however, the pattern was established to hinder 
African mobility beyond the sphere of an ill-paid, tightly controlled worker. 
African women were allowed to remain, in most cases, in petty trade or petty 
proprietorship, first because their economic contribution was correctly 
perceived as a necessary subsidy to low male wages in the family's effort to 
raise their children, and secondly because there was less demand for female 
labor from the capitalist sector until the fifties, 
A Note on Afro-Europeans 
Since many members of the nascent black petite bourgeoisie in the late 
nineteenth century were Afro-Europeans, and since Afro-Europeans enjoy a 
somewhat ambiguous position in the literature, I should state at the outset 
that I do not consider Afro-Europeans, or even so called assimilados (Africans 
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with sufficient education and material wealth to supposedly entitle them to 
equality under civil law with whites) as a separate category from Africans. 
Socio-economic differences between Africans and Afro-Europeans, as well as 
. stratification among all Africans and among all Afro-Europeans was usually 
based on differential access to land and property, but increasingly throughout 
this period their mutual class location derived from the Portuguese colonial 
system of racist ascription.l In the words of the Afro-European elite's 
newspaper, racism increasingly cut across class lines: 
Let them leave the native in a state of primitive ignorance so that the 
Negro only serves as manual labor under the yoke of a white man, illiterate 
though he may be ••• All this would be tolerable if it was simply the case 
with bush blacks, but Merciful Lord, this is spreading to the middle 
class!2 
The privileges which accrued to the Afro-European elite of late nineteenth 
century Louren<;o Marques were due to the fact that some very important and 
wealthy African women lived with or married some equally influential and 
wealthy European men.3 By the turn of the century their children comprised 
the city's only settled middle class.4 They were able to exploit the 
property, prestige and social networks of both their African and European 
families and prospered until white families began to settle in significant 
numbers. As the white female population increased and as racial barriers 
consolidated in accord with increased demand for cheap black labor to service 
state and private· capital, fewer formal inter-racial liasons occurred among 
the wealthiest most influential groups.5 As the blood ties between the 
prominent Afro-European families and new white political leadership thinned, 
the former's influence dwindled. Most Afro-Europeans throughout the twentieth 
century, were just as unsuccessful as most Africans in their struggle to 
bequeath their hard earned prosperity to their · children. They suffered the 
bitter disappointment of seeing their hopes eclipsed by the expansion and 
consolidation of white privilege. 
The well educated, prosperous Afro-European elite did not forge their 
tentative alliance with poorer blacks or grapple with the contradictions 
inherent in that identification simply out of cultural sentimentality. 
Whatever the ironies, racism increasingly linked them ever more firmly to poor 
Africans. As one of their spokesmen noted, by 1909 racism was heavily eroding 
the value of the skills and property . which the African and Afro-European 
petite bourgoeisie counted on to maintain their privileges: 
It is no longer by ones merits that a person's worth is judged, 
it is by ones color •••• What one needs in order to compete for 
a position today is to be white •••• If you are colored, live on a 
few crumbs of bread--the land is for the whiteman.6 
Petty Trade 
Portuguese, British Indian, Chinese and African merchants all played a 
role in the trade of late nineteenth century Louren,;o Marques. Certain 
merchants, however, tended to dominate specific markets at specific levels. 
Sales of yard goods, for example, an important retail article among African 
consumers, were handled from wholesale to retail by British Indian 
merchants. 7 On the other hand, wholesale wine imports were handled almost 
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exclusively by Portuguese, but wine retail sales in urban areas were fiercely 
competitive among Portuguese, Indian, Chinese and a few African merchants. 
While licensing procedures in urban areas tended to favor Portuguese whites, 
sales in the interior were principally handled, unlicensed, by British Indians 
who simultaneously collected peasant produce and gathered crops such as maize 
and oilseeds to market for export .8 African trade was principally in local 
products such as meat, fish, fuel, and produce which they handled from 
production to retail.9 Aside from limited competition by Africans for urban 
wine retail licenses, and the commonplace but illegal brewing by African 
women, Africans were not directly in competition with large scale European and 
Indian importer/wholesaler interests. 
The structure of trade, particularly areas of competition and mutual 
benefit, partially explains why the Portuguese could curb African business in 
favor of Portuguese locals through political leverage in licensing and 
monopoly concessions, but were unsuccessful in their periodic attempts to 
unseat British Indians from their important share of local commerce.10 
British Indians served a useful purpose as stalking horse for both the 
Portuguese and British national bourgeoisies. They were responsible for the 
rapidly expanding sales of Portuguese national wines and British backed Bombay 
textiles to Africans in the interior. That fact was not overlooked in either 
Lisbon or London.11 The British Foreign Office could, and sometimes did, 
intervene to protect British Indian interests, not only because they were 
British subjects (a fact the Foreign Office often forgot when convenient), but 
also because they opened markets for British manufactured goods in areas of 
rural Africa where many other traders were unwilling to go.12 
Most Portuguese immigrants whom the state hoped to settle in productive 
occupations in Mozambique did not have access to sufficient capital, credit or 
business skills to takeover British Indian whoesale activity or textile retail 
sales even if they could manipulate the political scene to force Indian 
traders out.13 Trade· in local products in the peri-urban area provided an 
easier entry occupation for them. Furthermore, even if British Indians were 
pushed out of trade, they would probably continue to pose a competitive threat 
to other Portuguese immigrants for semi-skilled, skilled or managerial 
positions. Finally, while British Indians enjoyed the protection of 
international capitalist interests, Africans could certainly not expect 
similar treatment. 
Even Portuguese administrators who were openly sympathetic to fostering a 
local Portuguese petite bourgeoisie recognized that local tax revenue and 
expanding sales of Portuguese goods· among African consumers were dependent 
upon the bush trade of British Indians.14 Portuguese immigrants were 
anxious to compete for established urban retail sales, but showed little 
inclination to assume the risks of penetrating the interior.IS They were 
attracted to the peri-urban trade worked profitably by local Africans. 
British Indians, therefore, were too useful to invite persecution beyond the 
usual measure of Portuguese bombast, but African traders, particularly after 
the military defeat of their clans in the 1890s, were vulnerable to Portuguese 
encroachment • 
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century African traders, farmers, 
and fishermen supplied the city with meat, fish, produce, fuel, water and 
building materials. They controlled most of the river and coasting traffic, 
ferrying goods and passengers on their big magudhlwana (locally made 
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rafts).16 Fishermen worked the rich bays with traps, lines and rudimentary 
nets.17 Area women grew sweet potatoes, shell beans, manioca, cabbage and a 
host of other vegetables for sale at informal lower city (business district) 
markets, and door to door in the upper city (residential area for whites). 
Men grew tomatoes and tobacco and brewed palm wine for the city market.18 
From the mid-century, Africans played an important role in retail commerce, 
but their vigorous participation was increasingly curtailed. 
Completion of the Inuren~o Marques Railway dealt a heavy blow to raftsmen 
handling riverine transport. Firewood, charcoal, mangal poles, stone, water, 
and landfill, once handled by raftsmen were increasingly brought to the city 
as railway ballast. The magudhlwana were becoming extinct in the 1890s.19 
Africans were further deterred as the state alienated the woodstands and 
quarries they formerly used as concessions to state clients. Rail-line and 
riverside, the most profitable areas, were the first to be absorbed by 
concession hunters.20 
Africans continued to produce for the urban fresh produce market, but by 
the turn of the century conditions in that area were similarly turning against 
them. The city's Chinese community was given permission to cultivate the 
extensive .. landfill area adj a cent to the port. 21 They used the capital 
accumulated from their diverse activities as artisans and petty traders to 
hire volunteer labor, purchase market stall licenses and provide 
transportation for their produce. They were highly skilled horticulturalists, 
and despite the Africans' use of family labor to diminish their costs, they 
were not able to compete on the same scale as the Chinese.22 
The displacement of African market production and retail sales was uneven 
and complex, but by the thirties most African traders, fishermen and suppliers 
had been forced out of the city's market by the cumulative weight of 
political and economic factors and the companion concession and licensing 
programs were the key political factors. Access became limited to those who 
could purchase or manipulate concession of a license.23 
The Municipal Slaughterhouse and the Vasco da Gama Market, built in 1887 
and 1903 respectively, like so many other so-called public works projects, 
subsidized white prosperity at African expense. Both facilities were built 
with conscripted labor on land alienated from its former African 
inhabitants.24 Despite the important African investment in land and labor, 
both facilities were not only designed to service principally white consumers, 
but also to curb Africn opportunities to compete with whites and to funnell 
African consumers to white merchants. 
With the completion of the Municipal Slaughterhouse the white-controlled 
municipal council took monopoly control over the wholesale meat market and 
partial control over retail sales. Henceforth only meat slaughtered at the 
municipal facility could be legally sold in the city, and only designated 
butchershops could handle the meat .25 Africans who formerly slaughtered and 
sold their livestock directly to urban consumers were required to sell 
wholesale to the slaughterhouse, and eventually quotas were established to 
allow European and assimilado cattlemen to sell their beef at an advantage 
over Africans at the market.26 During the employment crises of the lat.e 
twenties, the Municipal Council set qualifications for certified meat cutters 
which, while stopping short of racist exclusion, gave whites sufficient 
advantages to discourage biack competition.27 
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By licensing market stalls and restricting all sales outside the market to 
licensed ambulatory vendors, the municipal council monopolized control over 
produce and fish sales as we11.28 When the market opened in the early 
twentieth century, the cheapest license for a stall cost more than two months 
average wages for an African adult male.29 Formalization of the lower city 
market forced many African traders to look to informal Sunday markets outside 
the formal city limits. Ximpamanine, the largest, most popular of the 
informal markets in the first decade of the century was periodically harrassed 
by police as it became increasingly competitive with the formal central 
market. Police were ordered out to check traders for ambulatory vendors 
licenses, and to pressure them to lease the unlicensed stalls at the Vasco da 
Gama market. Since over a hundred traders competed at Ximpamanine and the 
Municipal Market had only fifty stalls vacant, the crackdown was intended to 
curb overall retail competiton, encourage higher prices and re-route customers 
to the municipal market.30 
African sellers dispersed and constantly relocated to foil police, but by 
the twenties the Municipal Council compromised and proposed formalizing the 
Ximpamanine Market. In exchange for the capital invested in building benches, 
a shelters, and installing plumbing the city hoped to accumulate revenues from 
licensing, and to bring Ximpamanine prices into line with those downtown.31 
Ximpamanine continued to be a prosperous· weekend market, but it was too far 
removed from the major employment centers to compete for most working people's 
daily purchases. 
Fuel supplies similarly came under the State's bureaucratic control net. 
Licensing curbed African participation at the retail level and concessions 
curbed access to suppies. City zoning laws restricted areas where wood and 
coal could be accumulated for sale, and licenses for such deposits were 
considered political plumbs. When the best local woodstands were granted as 
concessions to politically influential businessmen, African woodsmen and 
raftsmen were forced to go further away to cut wood, thus making their whole 
operation less cost-effective, or work as wage labor for the 
concessionaire.32 
As middle-class residential areas and industries increasingly adopted gas 
and electricity, firewood sales diminished and the fuel concessions became 
less attractive to Europeans who had capital to move into businesses with a 
more profitable future.33 Firewood sales in African areas remained in the 
hands of suburban women who worked independently and on a very small scale. 
There was a wholesale firewood operation at Ximpamanine, but until the city's 
population boomed in the late fifties, it was not a particularly attractive 
concession since most Africans arranged their own firewood or bought it from 
individual women in their neighorhood.34 
As early as the 1880s, Goan, Greek, Italian and Portuguese fishermen 
joined Africans in exploiting the rich fishing waters of Delagoa Bay outside 
the harbor. 35 In 1910 Africans still outnumbered all other fishermen by a 
margin of three to one. Despite their simple technology and lack of motorized 
boats, their share of the whoesale fish market reflected their three-to-one 
margin.36 Controls were extended over African fishermen from the first 
decade of the century, but despite their role in forcing Africans out of 
direct retail sales, the city remained dependent upon the Africans' catch at 
wholesale until the late thirties. 37 By 1907, only one of twelve licensed 
fish mongers and four of ten licensed raftsmen were Africans, and by 1909, 
only one of thirty-five registered fish trappers was African.33 
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Like the peri-urban market gardeners, African fishermen were increasingly 
forced to sell to wholesalers rather than direct to consumers, and since most 
market gardeners and fishermen organized their operations on the basis of 
family, rather than wage labor, households were prevented from making the best 
use of their resources. For long periods extant restrictions and controls 
were ignored, but periodically the state would go ahead and destroy 
unregistered traps or arrest men caught line fishing from the wharf area. 
Faced with such harassment, many families turned to the less-profitable but 
still unhampered African markets upriver from the city, or to work as wage 
laborers or on a commission basis for non-African fishermen.39 
Throughout the century the state had expressed its hope to develop fishing 
as a protected industry for metropolitan immigrants, but it always failed to 
invest sufficient resources to explore the industry's potential, to develop a 
fleet and train crews to manage the fleet.40 By midcentury a well 
established, but small community of Goans supplied most of the fish to 
Louren~o Marques. They were politically loyal clients of the regime and even 
received conscript labor to work their boats as late as the early 
sixties.41 The African catch remained too significant to allow the state to 
force them out, but they were not. encouraged to develop beyond the lowest 
level. 
Professionals and Bureaucrats 
The level of white unemployment in Louren~o Marques was the barometer of 
formal and informal persecution of African business people and skilled 
workers. The local white business community often advocated channeling all 
business opportunities, no matter how petty, to white Portuguese in order to 
alleviate white unemployment and to place greater control of the local economy 
in Portuguese hands. The same policy of funnelling any and all attractive 
positions to white Portuguese whenever possible carried through with respect 
to professionals and bureaucrats.42 
Training and education for Africans were cautiously introduced by the 
twentieth century to lower the cost of skilled labor, to cultivate a 
disciplined comprador group, and to establish a local pool of skills.43 
From the start, however, care was taken to reinforce black subordination and 
to protect white workers. The Portuguese saw little reason to allow Africans 
to become any more skilled than required to cut the cost of reproducing the 
system. A highly educated or trained black man, the Portuguese secretary 
general cautioned in 1910, might come to think of himself as "superior to 
others and [not] want to work" or "not send his wife to wash white 
laundry ... 44 Africans were to be coached as reliable diligent workers. The 
main idea was to instruct them in the need and value of selling their labor at 
wages and in conditions inferior to those received by white workers.45 
Portugal's paper-pretty ideology of non-racial cultural assimilation, set 
firmly in the context of a cd'lonial economy based on the exploitadon of 
cheap black labor by white capital with, at best, brown management, was 
quickly reduced to hollow window-dressing. It could not meet the challenge of 
meshing black skills with appropriate employment. The most striking example 
of the awkward attempt to train skilled black professionals and yet employ 
them in designated inferior conditions was the development of subordinate 
professions the so-called native nurse, native teacher and native 
7 
policeman. Applicants for native nurse, for example, were required to have 
the educational status of assimilados and were therefore theoretically no 
longer supposed to be considered natives.46 The distinction native, 
however, was necessary to justify paying them lower salaries and awarding them 
virtually no benefits. 
Nursing was the best-paid subordinate profession for men, and eventually 
for women. When the first state nursing school for blacks was proposed in 
1919 it was coolly received by the black community. They had long ago learned 
that the state was reluctant to pay appropriate wages for black skills.47 
Wages set for the original program were indeed so low that no qualified 
students volunteered, and thus the entering class had to be coerced.48 Of 
the original thirteen unenthusiastic students, all passed the first year 
because the state did not wish to face the problem of failing the lot of them, 
but the next year only three passed, and four were dropped due to 
absenteeism. During the 1912~1913 term six passed, six failed, and six 
dropped out -- hargly an auspicious beginning.49 Women were not admitted 
until the thirties, and the first woman graduated in 1936.50 
While nurses, particularly women, earned high wages by black standards, 
there was a broad gap between white and- black wages within the profession. In 
the thirties and forties, top level registered African nurses earned twelve 
hundred escudos a month without benefits, while white student nurses earned 
the same wage, and were further entitled to free room, board and 
utilities.51 Lidia Felizmina Tembe, for example, entered nursing school in 
1948 as an adult with two daughters. She enjoyed assimilado status by virtue 
of having her legitimate birth recorded in the civil register. She had a 
fourth class school certificate from the Swiss Missions, and was thus 
qualified to apply to the state nursing school at Hospital Miguel Bombarda. 
Nurses who trained and worked at the Swiss Mission Hospital and at Miguel 
Bombarda helped Lidia with the papelada (red tape and forms), and Lidia's 
mother and grandmother helped her pay the five to six hundred escudos 
necessary to cover all fees, and they took care of her children while Lidia 
was in training. Lidia did not enjoy the privilege of free room and board.52 
She could not have attended nursing school without the money her mother 
and grandmother earned illegally brewing uputsu (millet beer), and once she 
completed school she found it necessary to earn money illegally herself in 
order to support her family. Lidia's first position was in the north, where 
living expenses were lower than in Louren,;o Marques, but her eight hundred 
escudos a month salary did not cover the cost of Lidia's living expenses plus 
tuition at a local boarding school for her daughters.53 If her daughters 
were not in boarding school Lidia could not have gone to work. To supplement 
her salary, ·Lidia assisted at home births. Home births were officially 
discouraged, and technically Lidia was not supposed to be paid for attending, 
but most African families paid her something. If a home birth in a white 
household was inevitable, Lidia assisted, but there was no mention of a fee or 
gratuity. Even in nursing, the most lucrative profession a woman could have 
within the state sector, Lidia's family had to earn money illegally to cover 
her training and Lidia had to earn money illegally to educate her own 
daughters. 
Lidia was clearly better off than her sisters who spent days gathering 
wood to make a few bags of charcoal to sell for a pittance, but because her 
profession was so tightly controlled she was hardly prosperous. While her 
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mother had been able to see her daughter move into a more secure and 
satisfying livelihood than she had enjoyed, Lidia's chances for doing the same 
for her own daughters were slim. She had reached the ceiling for black upward 
mobility. White women with similar training could expect much more for their 
children. 
In the nineteenth century some Africans and Afro-Europeans held important 
military and civil service positions and enjoyed equal pay and mobility with 
whites. By the nineteen thirties, only a handfull of Afro-Europeans, all of 
whom had very strong family and patronage ties, still held top jobs.54 By 
the end of the Second World War, most educated Africans and Afro-Europeans 
were trapped in designated black jobs, subordinate professions, 
apprenticeships or lower echelon civil service posts. 55 Nowhere were white 
Portuguese more successful in their struggle to secure and entrench their 
privileges than in the civil service. Despite efforts by some white employers 
and petty bureaucrats to profit from exploiting cheaper Indian and African 
labor, white Portuguese not only held the line of black promotion, but 
actually displaced blacks from many well paid positions through both formal 
legislation and informal practice. 
At the turn of the century the local black elite still espoused the 
liberal ideal that hard work and a hard won education would eventually bring 
prosperity and success.56 The increasing inability of their trained, 
skilled, educated peers to find appropriate employment, faced with the ever 
lowering ceiling of black mobility, highlighted the pattern of downward 
mobility among the elite and eroded their confidence in the system.57 
Education, training and mobility varied in quality and emphasis in the private 
and public sectors. The state's overall control of foreign mission standards, 
and its own importance as an employer ultimately tended to diminish the impact 
of such variations. The Swiss Missions, for example, trained and educated 
their congregation in the vernacular and employed them within their own 
educational and health programs with a minimum of differentiation, but unlike 
the state, it did not have a local white constituency to accommodate, nor did 
it have sufficient positions within its own undertakings to absorb all its 
students. Outside the mission community, foreign mission students were often 
suspect, particularly by the Portuguese, because the missions allegedly failed 
to instill the appropriate attitude of deference and subordination among 
blacks. According to a Portuguese government official, "without a doubt, the 
black catequists of Swiss and Wesleyan Missions • • . are the most 
insubordinate, most averse to wage labor, and least cooperative of all the 
natives."58 
Some important divisions within the local black elite, and the community 
as a whole derived from allegiance to various missions and mission-inspired 
networks. The Catholic-trained Portuguese-speaking elite, for example, looked 
to the state for patronage while the Protestant mission constituency often 
spoke English as a second foreign language, and looked to the English-speaking 
private sector for employment.59 Contrasting networks exacerbated 
divisions, particularly in hard times when too many qualified applicants 
competed for too few jobs. The Catholics felt that the state owed them 
preference as good Catholics and good Portuguese. They criticised Protestants 
for their use of the vernacular, and harshly dismissed the Muslim community as 
"subjects of the Sultan of Turkey. "60 While fierce job competition 
highlighted schisms within the elite, the state's .increasing tendency to place 
and promote metropolitan immigrants over any and all 
to counter the schisms by rendering all blacks, 
networks, of secondary importance to all whites. 
Proprietors 
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blacks ironically worked 
regardless of patronage 
By the late nineteeenth century only a small part of what became the 
colonial city of Louren~o Marques had been removed from African control 
through military force and the colonial dual legal system. A series of 
vassalage agreements dating from the 1860s provided the fragile base for 
Portugal's claims to urban and peri--urban lands, but only after the military 
victory over the ruling African clans in the 1890s was Portugal in any 
position to exert her claims.61 Most of the land remained as so-called 
native reserve with usufructory tenure until purchased, leased or expropriated 
as the city grew.62 Usufructory tenure was better described as non-tenure. 
This paper does not attempt to identify, beyond a general level, who was 
able to exploit access to land or how, but rather to demonstrate the various 
tactics used by the state and municipality to enhance the value of white 
property and to channel valuable property to whites, despite the negative 
impact those tactics had on African property owners. The cumulative impact of 
state and municipal legislation and private and public employee housing 
policies curbed the tendency for a propertied black petite bourgeoisie to 
emerge. 
Most Africans held their land in usufructory tenure as reserve residents, 
but the case of the San Jose L'hanguene reserve demonstrated the insecurity of 
such tenure. At the turn of the century residents were evicted from part of 
the reserve so that the state could build a leper quarantine station in their 
midst.63 Both the state and the city typically located their undesireable 
but necessary facilities in black areas. Over the following ten years the 
reserve was pillaged for landfill to supply the extention of the railway and 
commercial port zone. The pits which were allowed to remain unfilled or 
unleveled collected water and contributed to the malaria problem in the 
reserve. In 1915, when the increased reserve population was struggling to 
live on its diminished holdings, land was taken again -- for a wartime powder 
magazine!64 The ultimate irony in the San Jose L'hanguene saga was that the 
largest block of land alienated from the reserve in the colonial period went 
to the municipal water and power company for their new installation. The 
residents of San Jose, like their neighbors in all the black suburbs, had 
spent much of the century struggling to obtain adequate and clean water 
supplies for their families.65 
Only persons qualified for protection under civil law, as compared with 
so-called native custom, were allowed to acquire land with freehold tenure. 
Three avenues were generally employed by Africans to register their lands. 
African women who married, lived with, or otherwise courted European friends 
could prevail upon them to register their personal or mutual lands in 
freehold. The same was true for their children. A second route was taken by 
mission converts who registered their lands with the help of the mission 
community. Missionaries, anxious to remove their converts · from the 
jurisdiction of their pagan elders, were pleased to oblige. Finally Africans 
with the means to do so could hire a European procurator to register their 
claims. 
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The nineteenth-century marriage alliances between foreign traders and 
local authorities provided the basis of land wealth held by much of the city's 
Afro-European proprietors;66 Kocuene Mpfumo, for example, was the 
daughter-in-law of Portuguese ivory trader and sometimes diplomat Joao 
Albasini. She was also the daughter of Maxaquene Mpfumo clan leader and niece 
of Mpfumo queen Sibebe.67 Kocuene Mpfumo's property accrued in freehold to 
her Albasini children whereas Sibebe's lands became native reserves. Since 
Si bebe' s income and prestige was based upon her ability to grant access to 
land and settle disputes, as the state assumed those powers, her income 
dropped, and by 1916 Sibebe was so poverty-stricken· that her nephew Jo"!fo 
Albasini petitioned the administration to grant her a state subsidy to keep 
her from total disgrace.68 
Mission educated Africans Joao Tomas Chembene and Jim Boy Chinunga 
registered lands in freehold with the assistance of patrons in the mission 
communities. Chembene did not live from rents, but worked all his life for 
the British shipping firm Allen Wack & Co.69 Chinunga had quite extensive 
holdings. He hired Portuguese procurator Manuel Fernandes to collect his 
rents and attend to his legal affairs. Upon his death Chinunga's land passed 
to his nieces, and, with Fernandes's continued intervention, they were able to 
live on his rents.70 
Chinunga was an exception. According to the 1912 census only 1.6 of the 
city's Afro-Europeans earned their living as proprietors and only three of the 
5,695 Africans included in the census were proprietors. 71 The 1940 census 
similarly counted only three African proprietors.72 The census did not 
reveal those who supplemented their income with rents or those who built 
rental housing on reserve lands. According to municipal sources, by 1937, 244 
units of rental housing were owned by Africans in the suburbs. Much of this 
housing was built on rented lands with any number of arrangements for 
tenure.73 Romeu dos Santos Correia, for example, owned a plot in the 
Munhuana suburb. In the late thirties three women lived in houses on his 
property. The houses were built and owned by other Africans, not by Santos 
Correia. The tenants paid rent to the house owners plus an annual land rent 
to Santos Correia.74 
Most Africans built and rented wood and zinc houses on a very small scale, 
and official policy was to see that it remained that way.75 By 1947 it was 
municipal policy to deny housing permits for either residence or rental to 
Africans seeeking to build on land they did not own, and to deny permits for 
rental housing even if the petitioner owned the building site. 76 
Furthermore, land transactions involving Africans and "private parties" were 
subject to review on the paternalistic pretense of· protecting unwary Africans 
from swindle. The Comissao Defesa dos Ind:!genas (Native Defense Comission), 
first established in the twenties, had jurisdiction over such sales and could 
intervene to prohibit them.77 
The creation and manipulation of municipal building standards was another 
important aspect of the marginalization of African proprietors in the central 
city. In the late nineteenth century, reeds thatch and poles were still free 
to those willing to collect them. Hewn wood, nails, zinc sheets and masonry 
supplies were expensive imports. Reed and thatch homes were called huts, and 
wood, zinc and masonry homes were called houses.78 In 1875 huts were banned 
from the town enclosure as a fire hazard. Ten hut fires in 1875 created the 
crisis necessary to trigger the ban, but according to Governor Noronha, most 
11 
of the fires were of suspicious origin.79 Perhaps huts were a fire hazard, 
not because they caught fire more easily than wood and zinc. homes, but because 
it was such a temptation to torch them. In 1907 municipal health officials 
similarly took advantage of a crisis situation, a plague· scare, to demolish 
the homes and businesses occupied by Africans, Indians, and Chinese " of the 
lower social scale," despite the fact that the acknowledged source of the 
disease was the city's own dormitory for its conscript labor force.BO 
Municipal standards pinched Africans above the "lower social scale" as 
early as 1910. While thatch and cane homes remained within the budget of most 
working people, purchasing boards, planks and zinc panels required a 
significant accumulation of capital. Even African families who earned the 
highest salaries had to scrape to save for a wood and zinc or all zinc home. 
Masonry·, the most expensive mode of construction was virtually beyond reach of 
the African population, including the local elite.Bl The City Sanitation 
Code of 1910 shocked the elite by proclaiming that no more permits would be 
issued for wood and zinc housing within the central city--henceforth only 
masonry construction would be permitted.82 Implementation of the code was 
uneven, particularly in recession periods, but as the white community became 
more prosperous there was a lobby to go further with restrictions. Throughout 
the late thirties the city council tried to legislate all so-called huts and 
wood and zinc houses occupied by Africans out of municipal boundaries. The 
municipal curator of native affairs resisted until the planned native 
neighborhoods were laid out to accept the evicted population.83 By law 
number 616 of 16 November 1938 the municipality established an African housing 
zone outside the city and ordered that any kind of housing. would be permitted 
within that zone, but only masonry would receive a permit within the city.84 
Several waves of evictions took place in the forties. Families who had 
been living on the Swiss Mission lands which the city had purchased .were 
ordered to leave, and the small Polana clan, whose lands had been ceded to 
Oscar Sommershield in the late nineteenth century but never developed, was 
evicted in 1946.85 Eventually freehold owners were affected as well. Lidia 
Tembe's grandmother, for example, the elderly Fatima Sara, owned land and a 
wood and zinc house next to the former Swiss Mission property in the 
increasingly white commercial and residential zone at .the corner of Avenida 
Afonso Albuquerque and Pinheiro Chagas. She and her daughter had lived there 
since the first decade of the century, but in 1960 the old woman was forced to 
sell because she could not afford the masonry home required by the Urban 
Esthetics Commission code of 1943.86 
The patterns of eviction and racial segregation increasingly forced locals 
and migrants, poor and prosperous blacks to live together in ever more crowded 
circumstances. At the same time a complementary pattern of differential 
investment heightened economic as well as racial segregation in the city. Tax 
money was invested in facilities and services for white areas, while heavily 
populated black neighborhoods went without adequate water, paved roads, 
regular cleaning and sewerage collection, lighting and· transportation 
facilities·. Crowding and inadequate facilities exacerbated tensions between 
local established families and the ever-increasing, almost always poor, 
migrants. What few services locals had been able to force from the 
municipality after long struggles were almost immediately overtaxed by the 
burgeoning population. Many locals felt threatened by the newcomers, but 
their efforts to safeguard their neighborhoods against the influx sometimes 
led into important, if often tense and temporary, alliances with the migrant 
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population to lobby the white controlled municipality for necessary services. 
Slowly and fitfully they came to realize that the ultimate source of the day 
to day conflicts they blamed on each other was the municipality, and the white 
businesses and residents who exploited their control of the municipal and 
state offices to benefit from the system of differential investment which so 
negatively affected black neighborhoods.87 
Summary and Conclusions 
The Portuguese were committed to fostering a client white petite 
bourgeoisie from poor, unskilled Portuguese immigrants as a base for 
unflagging local political support. Immigrants competed for the kind of small 
scale, easy entry level business opportunities often undertaken by Africans, 
but the immigrants benefitted from the bureaucracy's arsenal of controls to 
increase their competitive edge. Skilled and capitalized foreigners further 
compromised the ability of local Africans to compete beyond the level of very 
small scale businesses. Finally, the chronic shortage of black labor due to 
the overwhelming preference of Mozambicans to sell their labor at higher wages 
and in better conditions in neighboring countries further encouraged the state 
to exercise its control to channel as much of the remaining population. as 
possible into wage labor. 
In conclusion, differential access to property, patronage, and education 
tended to separate locally born Africans from migrants, Catholics from 
Protestants from Muslims, Afro-Europeans from Africans, and males from 
females, These divisions were reinforced through competition for employment, 
housing, health and educational facilities, particularly as the field for 
black competition narrowed. The narrowing parameters, which were caused by 
the lowering color bar in employment, licensing in businesses and racial 
segregation through residential zoning and housing standards, heightened 
awareness within the entire black community that increasing cross-clas.s racism 
paradoxically tended to unite the community by diminishing the class 
characteristics which divided them. That awareness, however, was not 
successfully forged into a persistent strategy for community based advancement 
in this period. 
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